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unwinding at the opposite face.
Thus, if the first replisome to
approach the Ter site arrives at the
nonpermissive face, the Tus–Ter
complex will become locked and
block the helicase (Figure 1A–D).
But when the second replisome
later approaches the permissive
face of Tus–Ter, unwinding at that
face may weaken the locked
complex sufficiently to allow the
second replisome to proceed
through the Tus–Ter complex
(Figure 1E–G).
The Mulcair et al. [7] work
demonstrates that partially
unwound DNA is responsible for
polar arrest mediated by the
Tus–Ter complex, as no helicase
protein was used in this study. The
results suggest that polar arrest is
dependent uponunwindingaction,
and not the particular helicase
protein. In fact, it was previously
reported that the Tus–Ter complex
blocks several unrelated helicases
in a polar manner [8,9,11–14],
supporting the idea that polar
mediated arrest is intrinsic to the
Tus–Ter complex. The new study
provides a mechanistic rationale
for these earlier data. However,
polar arrest may be mediated by
additional mechanisms. For
example, it has been reported that
DnaB makes specific contacts
with the Tus protein which may
contribute to polar arrest [15], and
a complete description of the
Tus–Ter polar arrest mechanism
may therefore be quite complex.
The base-flipping of Ter C6 is
reminiscent of DNA structural
modulations that are catalyzed by
base excision repair enzymes and
DNA methyltransferases [16,17].
These enzymes also bind tightly to
a base that is flipped-out of duplex
DNA.However, there are important
structural differences between the
Tus–Ter interaction and these
other enzymes. In the base repair
and methyltransferases, the DNA
duplex remains annealed on either
side of the flipped-out base. In
contrast, at least five base-pairs
must be melted in Ter DNA to form
the locked structure with Tus.
Furthermore, Tus binds Ter at the
flipped out C6 and also at the
adjacent unpaired A7 nucleotide.
Thus, the Tus–Ter complex uses
a distinct, dynamic mechanism
to stabilize protein binding to
partially unwound DNA, creating
a one-way block to the advancing
replisome. Researchers can now
investigate if this elegant
mechanism is utilized by other
protein–DNA machines.
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Food-storing corvids are able to remember which individual saw them
store food, and take preventive action that is tailored to that particular
competitor’s knowledge. This raises the question of whether abilities like
‘theory of mind’ have arisen independently more than once in evolution.Richard W. Byrne
How do we know that an animal is
intelligent? Or, more to the point,
what clues are we using when we
attribute the very human quality
of ‘intelligence’ to an animal?
There is always a risk of
anthropomorphism, but in facta study that swapped accounts of
complex behaviour between
different species, ranging from
humans to rabbits, found no effect
of species on lay people’s
judgements of whether the
behaviour was intelligent [1].
Evidently we mainly rely on the
behaviour itself. Species that have
Dispatch
R687an elaborate motor repertoire
have a head start in demonstrating
their abilities: a chimpanzee’s
dextrous hands and bimanual
coordination gives them a big
advantage compared, say, to
a limpet. But the widespread
recognition of advanced cognitive
abilities in cetaceans shows that
human-like effector organs are
not necessary to show an
intelligent appreciation of the
world. I suspect that our reasoning
about animal intelligence generally
boils down to judging how many
aspects of the environment an
animal evaluates when deploying
its actions. Most animals are
sensitive to quite a wide range of
environmental stimuli: even the
simplest respond to gradients of
temperature or chemical
concentration, to gravity, light or
other fields. Learning to react to
simple stimuli that correlate with
food or danger is also surprisingly
ubiquitous. Recent work on animal
behaviour has shown that some
species go a lot further than that,
and it is not always the species
that we might have suspected.
One way in which animal
cognition may develop greater
sophistication is by allowing
states of the world to be taken into
account evenwhen they cannot be
detected at the time, by using
memory or deduction. African
cercopithecine monkeys are well
known for labelling several
different predators with their
vocalizations. Because monkey
groups mostly comprise related
individuals, this serves to alert kin
to the precise nature of a predator
threat. Alarm calls are also given
by the local birds, and monkeys
learn to attend to them. However,
the information conveyed may not
be so precise: for example,
guineafowl give the same alarm for
many different predators. Artificial
playbacks show that Diana
monkeys, hearing a guineafowl
alarm, also take into account what
they remember having heard in the
last few hours. If human voices
have been broadcast, the
monkeys react as if the bird’s
alarm signalled hunters; but if
leopard sounds had been played
they react as if the alarm meant
leopard [2]. That monkeys can
combine the use of memory anda simple form of reasoning is also
shown by a recent discovery that
mangabey monkeys take the
weather into account when
deciding where to forage. If a fig
tree had unripe fruit the last time
they visited it, and the weather has
been warm and sunny since, they
aremore likely to check it outwhen
they are next in the vicinity [3].
Predators and weather share the
problem of their unpredictability,
and the monkey solution is to get
better information.
Arguably an even greater
challenge is to take into account
the mental states of other
individuals: what will they do next,
what are they planning, what do
they know, what are they after?
One simple way of anticipating the
demeanour and likely moves of
a conspecific is by recognizing
that it is currently doing something
that you also sometimes do. The
discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ in
monkey cortex, responding to
simple goal-directed acts whether
performed by the self or another,
shows that the primate brain is
adapted to parse others’ social
behaviour into familiar actions,
potentially allowing their
intentions to be anticipated [4,5].
But it is a bird, rather than
a primate, that has now provided
evidence for understanding of
mental states that goes well
beyond assessing immediate
demeanour and likely next
actions, and in a real sense
‘knowing their enemy’.
Several species of jay and
nutcracker (Corvidae) hide food
when it is abundant in the fall for
retrieval later in the winter. It would
pay them, therefore, tohaveagood
memory for where they hide food,
and whether they have already
emptied a particular cache: tested
in the laboratory, corvid spatial
memory indeed proved
spectacular [6]. Different types of
food will typically decay at
different rates, so it would also pay
to remember what they stored and
when they stored it. Again,
laboratory study showed that
some corvids remember what and
when they store, as well as where.
Given perishable and non-
perishable foods, scrub jays store
some of both; but they retrieve the
perishable foods only in the firstfew days after caching, afterwards
concentrating on non-perishable
items [7]. Even if they are given
items at different times, they are
able to track the elapsed time
relative to when they stored each.
Some species of jay also raid
each other’s caches, so it would
pay birds of these species to
anticipate pilferage of their own
caches and take evasive actions.
And indeed they do: scrub jays
that have themselves had the
opportunity to pilfer caches take
several precautions when they
store [8]. They prefer to cache
when they are on their own, and if
they cannot avoid being watched
they choose sites that are furthest
away from the competitor or in
dimly lit locations.Moreover, when
they get the chance of a bit of
privacy, they will re-cache foods
in completely new locations —
specifically those items others
watched them store. Finally, when
jays have been watched caching
and get no privacy in which to
move stores to safer places, they
fall back on the tactic of multiply
re-caching items in the same
general area. This does not impair
their own accuracy of recovery,
but it presumably spreads
confusion among observers.
Not all competitors present the
same risk: some may not have
seen much, and a bird’s mate is
‘on its own side’ so might not be
offering any risk at all. Can scrub
jays take individual characteristics
of other birds into account? Dally,
Emery and Clayton [9] have now
shown that they can. When
observed only by their mated
partner, jays did not bother to
implement their normal
cache-protection tactics of using
more distant sites and re-caching
in private any food stored in full
view. Jays can even take into
account what has been seen by
specific individual competitors.
The experimenters allowed their
subjects to cache food in two
trays: one tray (say, tray A) was
only available for storage when
individual A was able to watch
storage; the other (tray B) was only
available for storage when
individual B was watching. The
other trays were not removed
during these manipulations, but
covered with transparent perspex.
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to both trays, while observed by
individual A, or individual B, or
a control individual who had seen
food stored in one or other tray but
not by the subject itself. The jay’s
cache protection strategies were
adjusted to the particular
individual who had watched them
store: when individual A was
present, they multiply re-cached
food in tray A, and so on. Critically,
when a jay that had not watched
them store food was present, they
did not use themultiple re-caching
strategy — even though that bird
had seen food stashed in one of
the trays, so was presumably
eyeing the tray just as keenly.
Scrub jays are able to keep track of
who has seen their caching done,
and where.
Does this mean that scrub jays,
like humans, possess ‘theory of
mind’ [10] — that they know what
other individuals know, and work
out what to do to wrong-foot
them? Some scientists would
prefer to construct instead an
elaborate explanation in terms of
behavioural predispositions and
specific learning mechanisms.
This — as the researchers
themselves note — is certainly
feasible. However, the dichotomy
of mentalism/behaviourism is an
inherently unhelpful one (see [11],Liver Specificatio
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The endoderm generates many
important tissues, including the
lung, liver, intestine and pancreas.
The development of endodermal
organs occurs by a coordinated
sequence of events. For example,
liver development involves
establishment of competence for
liver formation, followed by liver
specification, hepatic bud
formation, growth anda Primer on this topic in a recent
issue of Current Biology). Theory
of mind is not itself an explanation:
it is a convenient label for a range
of interesting cognitive capacities
that need explanation; moreover,
mentalist accounts are hard to
disentangle from the
phenomenology of verbal thought
and pictorial imagery. Conversely,
explanations that depend on
putting forward an array of ad hoc,
special-purpose learning
mechanisms are unlikely to lead to
a broader understanding of the
evolution of cognition. What is
needed is to go beyond wrangles
over whether an animal is
human-like or not in some way,
whether the attribute is
‘intelligence’ or ‘theory of mind’,
and instead to build up a well
specified cognitive model that
describes their competence. With
the rapidly growing understanding
of corvid cognition it should not be
long before researchers are able
to do this, for a kind of cognition
that evolved quite independently
from our own, in a taxon that has
not shared an ancestor with us for
280 million years.
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endodermal patterning. In the
mouse, members of the forkhead
box A (FoxA) and GATA families
of transcription factors initially
enable the ventral foregut
endodermal cells to enter
a stage of competence; this
allows cells to respond to
inductive mesodermal signals
converging on a common
endodermal domain along the
primitive gut tube [3–5].
Fibroblast growth factor (FGF)
signals, emanating from the
cardiac mesoderm, have been
shown to be important
orchestrators of hepatogenesis at
multiple and distinct stages. While
FGF1 and FGF2 can induce the
expression of hepatic genes in the
specified endoderm, FGF8 is
thought to play a role in liver
